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Summary 
 
 
New and unstable democracies have to overcome many challenges before the 
new political system is fully consolidated. Reconstructing the civil-military 
relations is a vital part of the democratization process. This paper explores how 
and why new democratic regimes continue to rely on military power as a source 
of legitimacy, and how this affects the professionalism of the military 
organization. 
 
The traditional theories on civil-military relations are based on the western 
experiences and conceptions of democracy. The main argument of this analysis 
is that these theories fail to grasp the realties of how the military intervenes in 
political decision making, and how the military is manipulated by the 
democratic civilian government in non-western societies. A more context-
sensitive approach is advocated by Chabal and Daloz in their works on showing 
how African politics are based on a different rationality that the Weberian legal-
rational, even when there is formal separation between the public and the 
private.  
 
The civil-military relations of Uganda are chosen as a case study of how patron-
client networks continue to operate within formal state structures.  
Three aspects of the civil-military relations are singled out for analysis; the 
ethnic composition of the army, which has reinforced ethnic and regional 
cleavages, the corruption in the military which serves to maintain political 
influence and regime support, and the employment of military forces in the 
electoral process.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Theme 
 
Democracy is the only viable form of governance in the present political 
climate all over the world. Authoritarian regimes in various forms have all been 
discredited in the eyes of the international community, among the ordinary 
citizens around the world, in the financial world and even among former 
authoritarian leaders themselves. The advantages of the democratic system 
include socio-economical development as well as less violent conflict on all 
levels as democracies generally do not wage war against each other. It offers 
the opportunity for popular discontent to be mediated and resolved through the 
workings of the democratic institutions. National leaders who could have more 
to gain by holding on to their power and access to resources through non-
democratic styles of government, now finds that the only way to secure 
political, financial and military aid from the international community is by at 
least paying lip service to the demands for democratizating their regimes. 
Further more; military officers also realize that the times of successful coups 
have passed, and that their ambitions and grievances are better dealt with by 
the ballot than by the gun.  
1.2 Political Culture 
 
The focus of this paper is not to discuss whether these assumptions about 
democracy are valid, or whether democracy indeed can be linked directly to 
socio-economic development and greater respect for civil and political rights, it 
simply takes as it’s starting point the undeniable fact that after the end of the 
cold war there is a general consensus among political actors on all levels that 
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democracy is the only desirable option. Instead this paper wishes to explore 
the reasons why it is so difficult to achieve consolidated, stable democracies 
with democratic civil-military relations that are able to deliver a minimum of 
security in developing countries. There are an abundance of theories 
attempting to explain the failures and shortcomings of unconsolidated 
democracies. The whole spectrum of political theory is represented in theories 
ranging from agent centered rational choice, to institutionalism and 
dependency theories. Is the great project of democratizating the world failing 
because of bad governance or because of inherent, structural flaws in the 
international system? Not denying that both schools of though have a certain 
amount of explanatory power, this paper wishes to take an all together 
different starting point; the importance of political culture in the process of 
consolidating democracy.   
Lane and Ersson(2005) investigate the connections between cultural and 
political identity. I have chosen to focus on Pye’s definition from 1986 as Lane 
and Ersson(2005 p 31) presents it: 
“Political Culture is thus the manifestation in aggregate form of the 
psychological and subjective dimensions of politics. A political culture is the 
product of both the collective history of a political system and the life histories 
of the members of that system, and thus it is rooted equally in public events 
and private experiences.” 
This concept may be defined in either broader or narrower terms, but Pye's 
definition offer the distinct advantage of allowing for comparisons of both 
historical and recent events ,and to conduct analysis on both macro and micro 
levels. More importantly, this definition takes into account that political culture 
is psychological and subjective in nature; it is the norms, values and attitudes 
a group of people share in regards to how politics should be conducted in their 
society.  
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Democracy is more than just establishing a formal set of procedures and 
mechanisms for elections; it requires a set of values such as trust, tolerance, 
moderation and participation. Many transitions to democracy have been 
achieved through pacting and negotiations among the elites, but eventually 
these values must be internalized and shared by the majority of the population. 
These democratic values form the basis of what could be called a democratic 
political culture. People learn how to navigate and express their interests in the 
political system based on the opportunities and constraints it offers. The 
purpose of this analysis is to investigate how civil-military relations function 
under non-democratic political systems, and how they will continue this 
behavior even when democracy is introduced unless this system change is 
also accompanied by a corresponding profound change in the overall political 
culture.  
1.3 Different notions of political rationality 
 
If political culture is treated as a system of meaning, it is possible to 
incorporate the notion of rationality in the analysis, even when the political 
behavior in question seems to be quite contrary to achieving any kind of 
political goals.  People may be said to act rational if their actions are in 
accordance with their overall system of meaning. It is a basic part of human 
nature to attempt to explain their surroundings and events with the analytical 
tools available to them. This is the basis for the cultural approach advocated 
by Chabal and Daloz in their work on understanding African politics (1998 and 
2006). They do however not wish to speak of “political culture” as a variable 
that can explain or be explained using traditional political science methods of 
analysis. Instead they insist on applying a context sensitive perspective on the 
political processes themselves. Accepting the fact that the formal political 
institutions and procedures are in fact hiding underlying and informal political 
processes, their method is based on identifying the real politics that take place. 
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As their work in “Africa Works” illustrates, concentrating analysis on the formal 
aspects of politics like political parties, government policies and elections fail to 
grasp the real politics that are often played out in the blurring lines between 
the public and the private, and also the subtle influences on politics, such as 
ethnicity and superstitions. 
This paper will investigate how civil-military relations are structured according 
to the real power distribution between the government and the military 
establishment, and how each side will use different strategies to manipulate 
the relationship. 
1.4 The importance of the civil-military relations 
 
Put very simply, civil-military relations in a democracy is the result of the power 
struggle between the elected government, which is the highest expression of 
the people’s political will, and the military organization, which forms an 
extremely potent part of the state administration. It is widely recognized that 
the different branches within the state take on a life on their own so to speak, 
as they will promote their own areas of politics and try to gain as much 
resources as possible for their department. What makes the civil-military 
relations so unique is twofold, firstly, and perhaps very obvious but none the 
less striking, the military posses arms. It has the potential for wrecking havoc 
which no other part of the state apparatus can match. Secondly the tasks most 
often associated with the military are of vital importance to the whole state, 
and enjoys a very high degree of status. Defending and promoting national 
interests on the international arena is high politics par excellence.  
These two unique characteristics of the military means that the military has a 
very strong bargaining position. The democratic government’s solution is often 
to award the military substantial sovereignty in matters which are strictly 
military, and to rely on the military’s expertise while retaining control over vital 
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policy decisions. Huntington (1995) terms this form of control “objective civilian 
control”. This is a key term in much of the civil-military relations literature, and 
will be discussed further in the theory chapter. The opposite of objective 
civilian control is subjective civilian control over the military, which simply put is 
the use of propaganda and divide and conquer techniques to ensure the 
loyalty of the military to the civilian government.   
1.5 Political legitimacy based on military power 
 
The relationship between the military and the civilian leaders is of course 
highly reciprocal. The military may abuse its powers for various reasons, but 
equally dramatic and possible devastating is the abuse of military means by 
the civilian government. 
In stable democracies, the government’s legitimacy is based on being elected 
through free and fair elections, popular participation, and  allowing for and 
incorporating opposition through an active civic society. There is a clear 
separation between the formal and informal sectors of society. The state exists 
almost like a separate entity, and the state bureaucracy is based on the 
Weberian legal rationality.It is able to provide basic services, such as physical 
security through police and military establishments.  
Civil-military relations are mostly regulated as described above, both sides 
having internalized the basic values of democracy and therefore following the 
procedural rules of the game in praxis as well.  
In many new democracies, the actual situation is quite different. In many 
former colonies that adopted the formal democratic system of governance 
after independence, democracy failed to consolidate, and became nothing 
more than a hollow shell. Traditional modes of power and legitimacy continued 
to operate within this shell of formal institutions. Some democracies failed 
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completely, while others continued to operate as hybrids between authoritarian 
and democratic states. Africa alone experienced more than fifty military coups 
in the decades following independence. There are an abundance of theories 
aimed at explaining the failures of these new states, but for the purpose of this 
paper it is sufficient to note the prominence of military intervention in politics. 
All governments must base their regime on some sort of legitimacy. When 
democratic values are insufficiently internalized, it is possible to extract 
legitimacy through socio-economic development or even the personal 
charisma or heroism of a particularly popular leader. These modes of 
legitimacy are however of such a frail nature that a crises of legitimacy is 
almost inevitable. Regime stability and legitimacy may then ultimately be 
achieved by military means, suppressing political dissident through intimidation 
and violence. Experiences with this kind of political legitimacy would then 
foster a type of political culture where this is considered acceptable.  
  
Despite the fact that one of the major driving forces behind democratization is 
the wish for eliminating warfare, both external and internal, and abolish the 
horrors of previous regimes; civil-military relations do not often make it into 
these definitions.” State monopoly over the legitimate use of force” is an often 
cited prerequisite of democracy, but this vague term does not say anything 
about what constitutes a healthy state monopoly of the use of force. The 
military can be more or less formally under the control of democratic state 
institutions, and still exercise a degree of independence in the policy making 
and missions that are in violation of the people’s will or in extreme cases are a 
threat to the society.  
Democracy is not easy to achieve; no matter what specific experiences the 
country have had in the past, it requires compromise from all the actors 
involved; a level of knowledge of the proper workings of democratic institutions 
and a number of favorable socioeconomic circumstances in order to succeed.  
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Many of the states struggling to consolidate their new and fragile democracies 
in what is often termed the third wave of democratization, have had 
experiences with internal violence, which in many cases have involved the 
military forces overstepping their boundaries and committing human rights 
violations, whether the military have had formal authority as part or head of 
government, carried out suppressing measures on its behalf or acted in 
opposition to the government. On the other side of the relationship are those 
instances where civilian governments have used the military ensuring regime 
legitimacy, to suppress political opposition and manipulate the populace.  
There are three key areas which are very important to deal with in order to 
help consolidate new democracies with such bad civil-military relations;  
Firstly the military must be placed firmly under civilian control, which is a 
difficult task where the military, both the elite and the common soldier, have 
enjoyed special privileges. Secondly, the democratic government must not 
attempt to use the military for it’s own political agenda.  
Finally, the atrocities carried out by the military in the past calls for justice on 
behalf on the victims, and the ability and willingness of the new democratic 
government to do so depend on the strength and legitimacy of the government 
and the transition process itself. 
1.6 Research question 
 
There certainly seems to be a need for more research on the topic of civil-
military relations and the impact this relationship has on democracy, especially 
in the case of new and emerging democracies.  
Following these initial reflections on the importance of healthy civil-military 
relations in consolidating democracies, and likewise the importance  of deeply 
rooting democratic values, a number of important questions can be asked; 
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- What exactly constitutes healthy civil-military relations?  
- In what ways is the military establishment able to preserve their prerogatives 
when these have been eradicated by constitutional changes?   
- What happens when civilian leaders continue to abuse and manipulate the 
military forces for their own political gain and legitimacy? 
- How important is the state of the civil-military relations for the overall political 
culture in countries that are trying to move towards democratization? 
 
These initial reflections led me narrow down the scope of this paper to single- 
case study and formulate the following research question about the civil-
military relations in a country with an especially problematic history of military 
rule; 
How can civil-military relations in Uganda be explained by using a cultural 
approach? 
1.7 Case presentation 
 
Uganda was colonized by the British until 1962. The army left behind by the 
British was composed mostly of soldiers from the north, and Milton Obote, the 
first president, was also from the north of Uganda. He continued to favour the 
north, and thus the ethnic cleavages between the north and the south became 
even deeper. When Idi Amin came to power in 1971, he feared the many 
soldiers from the north, and disposed of the majority of them and replaced 
them with soldiers who had strong cultural and ethnic ties to himself. Museveni 
came to power in 1986 with his National Resistance Army (NRA), but he was 
opposed by northern based rebel groups such as The Lord's Resistance Army 
(LRA) which continues to destabilize whole regions of Uganda today. 
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The NRA leaders were not particularly interested in creating a democratic 
government after their victory, this was due to both a lack of knowledge and 
the challenges they faced trying to create legitimacy for their government. 
Therefore they created a so called broad based coalition Movement, which 
was little more than an attempt to co-opt their political opposition. But in 
keeping with the former tradition, they mainly relayed on the military to stay in 
power. One way to do this was to expand and strengthen the size and force of 
the military. The army grew from 10000 to over 100000 in less than five years, 
and the military expenditure grew as well. According to Amii Omara-Otunnu 
(1998), this helped the regime to reach four major goals: 
to allow the regime to dominate the state by coercive force, secure themselves 
from internal threats, make the population behave in a disciplined manner akin 
to the military and finally it would give employment to an otherwise restless 
population.   
1.8 Current civil-military relations in Uganda 
 
The official Ugandan army, The People's Defense Force (UPDF) consists of 
60000 soldiers, with an additional 2000 members of paramilitary border patrol 
units. Finally there are Local Defense Units (LDU) which are trained and 
operated by the UPFD, but they are financed through the Ministry of the 
Interior. The estimated number of soldiers serving in the LDU varies from 
15000 to 37000.  
President Museveni held the rank of general in the UPDF until April 2004; at 
that point he had to retire from the military due to new legislation that barred 
active military personnel from being active members in political parties. 
Although the constitution formally separates the military from the civilian 
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government, this distinction does not apply in the actual civil-military relations 
in Uganda. The military does not act as an a-political branch of the state 
structure; rather it is the main source of power and political legitimacy for the 
civilian government.  
The main problem areas of the current civil-military relations in Uganda may 
be summarized as the following: 
 The inability to resolve the conflict with the LRA 
 Human rights abuse by the UPDF and lack of punishment for this. 
 Large scale corruption among UPDF officers 
 Lack of professional autonomy for the UPDF 
 The government's use of the military to deter political opposition 
 
A focal point of this paper is to explain why these problems persist as Uganda 
is on the path to distance itself from the military rule of the past, and establish 
democratic institutions. When applying the above mentioned cultural 
approach, it seems the answer lies in the heritage of a political culture 
characterized by a widespread militarization of both politics and society.  
Amii Omara-Otunnu(1998) writes about the militarization of the political culture 
in Uganda (and Africa in general).The widespread occurrence of military coups 
in Africa, does  not only hinder and marginalize fundamental requirements for 
democracy, such as free elections and the right of association, but also tend to 
generate considerable changes in the political culture. The result is the 
emergence of militarism in the society as a whole. The hegemonic rule by the 
military, in which the military substitutes its preferences for the will of the 
general population, and the legitimizing of the use of political violence creates 
a situation where the people have no choice but to acquiesce in the values 
and priorities of the military, rather than subscribe to them voluntarily. This 
undermines the very basis of the moral authority of the state. 
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1.9 Structure of the paper 
 
In this paper I intend to explore the role of civil-military relations in new 
democracies, and my first task will therefore be to define what constitutes a 
healthy or good relationship between the democratic institutions and the 
military. This is no easy task as the very presence of a military force can be 
seen as a threat to democracy itself; I will return to this inherent contradiction 
in the first sections of the theory chapter.  
Since theoretical considerations are given a very important role in this paper, 
the relevant theory will be presented over two chapters. Chapter 2 deals with 
the dominant literature on civil-military relations. Chapter 3 is dedicated to a 
brief introduction to the illusive concept of political culture, and considerations 
on how a cultural approach will be very useful in this analysis.  
Methodology will be discussed in chapter 4. The main limitation is the lack of 
first hand data, and this problem is sought to be rectified by data triangulation. 
The strength of this paper lies in longitudinal perspective on the selected case, 
which will ensure that a wide specter of variables and possible connections are 
considered.  
Chapters 5, 6 and 7 consist of the actual analysis, where the relevant theories 
will be put to use in the attempts to understand and explain the mutually 
predatory relationship between civil government and the Ugandan army.  
The conclusion in chapter 8 will sum up the findings from the previous 
chapters, relating the neo-patrimonial character of the civil-military relations to 
the overall political culture of Uganda.  
12 
 
2 Theories on civil-military relations 
2.1 Context sensitivity 
 
The study of civil-military relations is a broad field, cutting across different 
disciplines, such as sociology, history and political, and also touching on many 
different sub disciplines within political science such as transition studies, 
democracy studies, political theory, development studies, constitutionalism 
and organization theory.  
I will start with a presentation of some notions about the civil-military relations 
which are found in the classical discussions about the inherent contraction 
between the civilian authority and the military authority. Then I will explore the 
key concepts “objective control” and “subjective control” which refers to the 
two basic means for ensuring civilian control over the military. Theories about 
the perception of the threat environment and role and mission assignments are 
also important to consider in this analysis.  
 Many of the theories and concepts developed in the past have been culturally 
biased, taking the western style of society as its starting point. As Chabal and 
Daloz (1999) have shown in their work on the reality of African politics, it is 
necessary to consider the context of the cases we are studying. Analyzing 
politics in Africa, for example, can not be done in a meaningful way without 
taking into consideration the widespread neo-patrimonial practices which 
exists alongside official state institutions and administration. All societies have 
different notions about the different organizational structures they adhere to, 
and ideas and values regarding the proper working of these structures and 
how the individual should interact with them. This extends to the civil-military 
relations as well, and people in different contexts have different ideas about 
13 
 
how this relationship should be, and what role the people themselves should 
have in this relationship. 
For now it is sufficient to note that there does not exist one, ultimate set of 
perceptions and ideas about how the civil-military relations should be 
organized in any given society, and that these ideas and values may vary quite 
much even between states that are formally democracies. This has important 
implications for how theories should be understood and used in the study of 
civil-military relations in developing countries.  
As I intend to be as context specific and sensitive as possible in analyzing the 
civil-military relations of Uganda, I will then enter into the discussion about 
political culture, how it emerges and which circumstances that create different 
form of civil-military relations in a separate chapter. 
2.2 An inherent contradiction 
 
The starting point of many discussions about civil-military relations is the 
inherent contradiction in the relationship between the civilian and military 
interests in democracies. On the one hand, a well-established democracy 
requires full civilian control and accountability over all areas of public interest, 
but on the other hand most countries deem it necessary to create and maintain 
military and security capabilities for their own protection and as a measure of 
international leverage. (From here on I will use the term “the military” to denote 
both military and official security forces, unless otherwise specifically noted) 
The military is by its very nature a potential threat to democracy; it posses a 
superior, highly effective organization, with arms at its disposal. The balance in 
the relationship between the military and the civilian democratic institutions is 
not often questioned in the minds of the ordinary citizen in peaceful and 
prosperous times, but it is very much a concern for those living under 
undemocratic regimes, or where the military have undue or excessive political 
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and societal influence and in extreme cases cast their professionalism aside 
for personal profit. What keeps the military from stepping outside of their 
defined areas of legitimate interest and intervene in the workings of the 
government and administration? With the gradual specialization of the society 
that followed the introduction of capitalism and the industrialization of the 
West, the answer came to lay in the professionalization of the military. I will 
return to this process and the theories underlying it shortly.  
2.3 Good and poor civil-military relations 
 
A natural point of departure for the study of civil-military relations is to find out 
what characterizes good or healthy civil-military relations on the one hand, and 
poor or unhealthy ones on the other. Even when being sensitive to the fact that 
there are different values and ideas about how these relations should be in 
different contexts, I believe it is possible to establish a minimum definition that 
corresponds to a minimum definition of democracy. 
J. Samuel Fitch (1998:37-38) lists three essential characteristics of a 
democratic civil-military relation: 
 1. The military must be politically subordinate to the democratic regime.  
This requirement goes directly to the core of the idea of democracy as a 
government of the people by the people. The government is an institution 
elected by the people, and it is therefore given the right to act on its behalf and 
promote the people’s interests. The military constitutes a part of the society, 
and has its own special corporate interests, and there is no guarantee that 
these interests and goals will coincide with those of the rest of the society. The 
military can therefore never legitimately claim to represent the will of the 
people. The military can however have a limited influence in policy making and 
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exercising based on their professional expertise, but the military can not have 
the right to veto the government’s proposals.  
 2. The civilian government must have full control over policymaking; there can 
not be a special area of security or national interests that are left exclusively in 
the hands of the military.  
 3. Military personnel must be subject to the same rule of law as the rest of the 
population. They have the same constitutional rights as non military citizens, 
and can not be granted special privileges.  
 
Another author who have written well about this subject, is Michael C Desch in 
his chapter on “Threat Environments and Military Missions” in “Civil-Military 
Relations and Democracy”(1996 :13). He states that although one can say that 
the relationship is good when the military stays strictly within its professional 
realm, and poor when the military strays outside that realms, in the case of 
coups for instance; he suggests that a better way is to analyze how civilian 
and military authorities handle policy differences, and that a healthy civil-
military relationship exists where the civilian stands prevails over the military 
ones. The author does not elaborate directly on this, but I take policy 
differences to mean both the broader questions of threat identification and 
mission assignments for the military, as well as policy differences in the sense 
of allocated defence budget and personnel management and appointment 
within the military.  
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2.4 Ensuring military subordination 
 
Due to the potential danger the military establishment may pose both to the 
civilian leaders in government and the population at large, the military’s 
capabilities and intentions must be placed under firm civilian control. In 
consolidated democracies this can basically be achieved through two 
mechanisms: objective civilian control, which is based on the professionalism 
of the military and subjective civilian control, which is based on politicizing the 
military. When it comes to the reality of many developing countries, it is 
necessary to also consider how neo-patrimonial practices are used to ensure 
military loyalty to the civilian leaders.  
Huntington (1995) is generally optimistic about the success of reforming civil-
military relations in the third wave of democratization around the world.  
He states that with only a few exceptions, these countries have fared much 
better in subordinating the military to civilian authority and control than they 
have in establishing and consolidating other aspects of democracy or further 
economic development. He also assess that the civil-military relations have 
improved greatly in comparison to the situation before the transition towards 
democracy. He attributes these successes to several factors, including a 
spread and acceptance of the idea that the military needs to be a professional, 
apolitical institution subordinated to civilian control. These are norms that are 
spread by the interaction of military elites and cooperation between the 
nations. There has also been a growing understanding that establishing 
objective control is in the best interest of both civilian and military leaders. 
Military regimes around the world have learned the hard way that solving a 
countries socioeconomic problems is not an easy task, and they are therefore 
more willing to stick to their own areas of professional expertise and leave the 
politicks to the politicians. There has also been a move towards realizing that 
employing military forces to gain advantages in the political game is a 
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potentially dangerous enterprise on the behalf of the civilian leaders competing 
for power, and that their interest are really best served by keeping the military 
a professional, neutral force.  
Thirdly, and in my view on of the most important factors in poor, undeveloped 
countries; civil-military reform that entails reduction of military spending, 
improvement in the respect of human rights, and transfer of military run 
business to civilian or state hands, are measures that are relatively easy to 
implement and which enjoys great legitimacy in both the eyes of the public and 
the international community. To be able to successfully carry out such reforms, 
the civilian government must of course already have a certain degree of 
leverage towards the military, and the first two points must already be in place.  
2.5 Objective and subjective control mechanisms 
 
Many scholars distinguish between two methods employed by the civilian 
authorities to ensure military subordination; objective and subjective control. 
These are key concepts in the study of civil-military relations, and were 
originally formulated by Samuel Huntington. 
The objective civilian control mechanism refers to: 
1. A high level of military professionalism, which means that the military 
officers recognize the limits of their professional competence, 
2. An effective subordination of the military to the civilian political leaders who 
have the responsibility for policymaking, and  
3. That the civilian leaders recognize and accept that the military posses a 
unique expertise, which 
4. Leads to the minimization of military intervention in politics, and likewise 
less political intervention in the military.(Huntington 1996) 
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Objective civilian control is the preferred mechanism for ensuring military 
subordination to civilian control in consolidated, stable democracies. This 
mechanism may not be feasible in new democracies that often have had poor 
civil-military relations in the past.  
In these cases subjective civilian control mechanism are often adopted in 
stead, and this refers to how the civilian leaders politize the military by the 
classic divide and rule tactics. According to Sundhaussen(1998: 336), this 
means that the military professionalism is not encouraged, and the military is 
not a separate institution set aside from the rest of the society. The main 
means of ensuring military loyalty is through ideological indoctrinations and 
propaganda. Different fractions of the civilian leadership may tie separate 
bonds with the military and use it for their own goals. This form of civilian 
control over the military corresponds best to the African reality, and will form 
an important part of the later analysis. 
2.6 Internal and external threats 
 
Michael C. Desch (1999) explores the linkages between the state of the civil-
military relations, and the perceived and defined threat environments. The 
nature and the location of the threats the military is assigned to deal with, have 
a major impact on the power balance between the civilian and military 
authorities. The nature of the missions can be either military or non-military, 
and the location can be internal or external. Many states today face challenges 
that are both military, and non-military in nature, as well as a mixture of these. 
Desch(1999) claims that traditional challenges that are military in nature and 
external in location produce the most healthy civil-military relations. Desch 
(1999:12-15) argues that this is the case because the civilian authorities are 
forced to be more cohesive when faced with these kinds of threats, and thus 
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they can deal with the military in a more unified fashion. They adopt objective 
control mechanisms, grating the military substantial autonomy in their 
professional areas in return for complete political loyalty. The military becomes 
less inclined to meddle in domestic affairs, as their attention is focuses 
externally. In times like these the civilian leadership may also enjoy greater 
legitimacy.  
Unhealthy or poor civil-military relations are more likely to appear when a state 
faces internal threats, as the civilian leadership may be more or less divided, 
and politize the military by bringing them into a civilian, domestic conflict. A 
significant domestic threat will also shift the military’s focus to the domestic 
arena, and thus facilitate military intervention and coups.  
A mixture of both external and internal threats does also have the potential for 
creating difficult civil-military relations, but generally not as poor as when the 
military is only focusing on internal threats. In the cases with mixed threats, or 
no perceived threats at all, other factors are more important in shaping the 
civil-military relations. Desch (1999) argues that the military’s doctrine can be 
an important explanatory factor in these cases, which contains the prevailing 
ideas about what role the military should have in the society as well as ideas 
about what their proper mission should be. 
2.7 Assigning the military its missions  
 
There are conflicting views on what effects the assignment of non-traditional, 
non-military missions to the military will have on the civil-military relationship. 
As we have just seen, Desch (1999) is highly critical of shifting the focus of the 
military from traditional external protection missions towards internal non-
military missions. Other scholars  regard the participation of the national 
military forces in regional and international peacekeeping operations as very 
conductive towards shaping new, more democratic military values through the 
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process of learning by example and interaction with fellow soldiers from 
countries with more stable and democratic civil-military relations. It has also 
been noted that participation in such operations may help the militaries who 
are seeking to define their new role in a more democratic setting with more 
civilian control and less political influence find a new arena for their services.  
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3 Theories on political culture 
3.1 The usefulness of political culture theories 
 
The vague concept of “political culture” rarely enters into the study of 
international politics, as it doesn't seem to fit in with the ideals of how political 
research should be conducted. It is often relegated to a residual category, or 
simply dismissed as the domain of other sciences such as anthropology and 
sociology. The aim of this paper is to demonstrate the usefulness of employing 
a cultural perspective on the challenges in reforming civil-military relations in 
developing countries. None of the previous mentioned theories are alone able 
to meaningfully explain why the military has so much political power, or why 
the political leaders continue to rely on the military as a political instrument 
despite great disadvantages and potential threat to their own regime.  
The main drawback with using rational choice theories on developing 
democracies, is that they fail to take into account that rationality is dependent 
upon the cultural setting. Institutionalism presupposes that politics are actually 
happening within the institutions and structures in the political system, and not 
in the informal way of most African states. And finally, dependency theory is 
too focused on the interaction between states in the international system as a 
whole to provide insights into politics on the local level, in this case the civil-
military relations within states. 
 
Applying a cultural perspective to understand civil-military relations has several 
advantages: 
- It allows for understanding the rationality behind seemingly irrational politics 
- it allows for analysis on micro and macro levels 
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- it explains why internal and external, military and non-military role 
assignment impact on civil-military relations 
- this perspective explains how illegitimate practices may in fact be considered 
necessary and even legitimate in the local context 
- it makes it possible to trace the development of military attitudes, role 
expectations, as well as investigate the instrumental use of the military by the 
political leaders.  
3.2 Ideal types of political culture 
 
David R. Mares(1998) suggests a framework for analyzing civil-military 
relations based on two components; Political culture and the constitutive rules. 
Mares(1998:3) gives a clear definition of the term:” Political culture comprises 
a people’s predominant beliefs, attitudes, values, ideas, sentiments, and 
evaluations about the political system of its country, and the role of the self in 
that system”. He contends that the study of their beliefs, values and ideals are 
sufficient for studying the civil-military relationship. 
Political culture is shaped by a state’s particular history and ideas that have 
evolved over a long period of time, but it acts as a causal factor in today’s 
events. It is by nature very stable, and changes very slowly, most often only 
after a dramatic change in the power balance between the civilian and military 
authorities, e.g. after coups.  
Mares(1998:3-5) identifies  four ideal types of political culture: liberal, 
corporatist, militarist and neo-patrimonial.  
A liberal political culture is characterized by its individualist nature and lack of 
a state fundament. The sovereignty lies with the people, and the government 
exists only to fulfil the minimum of services and functions for the people. The 
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military is one of these functions, and is as such subordinated to the will of the 
people through the government.  
In a corporatist political culture, the starting point is not the individual, but 
groups of people who organize according to their own group’s interests. Each 
group has a responsibility for the defence of the state, and they expect the 
state to care for the particular groups interests in return. The military itself is 
seen as one of the special interest groups and the constitutional arrangements 
opens the possibility for declaring a state of emergency fairly easily.  
The military in the militarist political culture are the bearer of the national 
vision, and can legitimately assume leadership because it is viewed as 
superior to the civilian authorities who are motivated by self interest and who 
also hinders development. In short, the military is better at making decisions 
than the politicians because they tend to be ineffective whereas the military is 
the protector of the nation’s interests and wellbeing. This also justifies 
maintaining a large military sector and defence budget. 
Neo-patrimonial political culture entails a strong hierarchy, which do not 
involve the people as political actors in the typical ways, but rather as the 
clients in a patron-client relationship. The military is one of several groups of 
elites that seek to influence the civilian leader and whom the leader controls 
though his network of trading power and services.  
 
Immediately it seems that Uganda falls into the category of neo-patrimonial 
political culture. The following analysis chapters will explore why this kind of 
political culture developed, and how it is in part maintained by the Museveni 
regime's manipulation of the military forces. 
 
 
24 
 
3.3 African political cultures 
 
African societies displayed a variety of political structures prior to colonization, 
depending on complexity and size they went from loosely organized tribal 
societies to empires ruling vast territories.  
Naomi Chazan (1994) gives a brief summary of the most common political 
values that existed in this era: Participation and representation were found 
among the Kikuyu's in East Africa and in Nigeria, and the kingdom of Buganda 
in Uganda incorporated interest groups in the decision-making process. 
Debate and reaching a consensus was considered an ideal. There existed 
procedures for removing unpopular leaders, and illegitimate political decisions 
and procedures were sanctioned through informal and formal mechanisms. 
Political power was often decentralized, allowing for local governance. The 
focal point was on the community at large, rather on the individual itself, and 
deference to elders, village and political leaders were a common feature in 
most of these societies. Some societies also displayed values of an 
authoritarian nature, such as prominence of the leader, where he would be 
vested with supernatural powers, and the use of military strategies to enforce 
the will of the leader.  
The colonial administrations were set up in such a way as to maximize the 
profit they could extract from the territories they acquired. The focus was on 
building efficient structures for domination, control and exploration of 
resources. Power structures were highly vertical in nature, with little or no 
opportunities for the local people to participate in the official state structure. 
Only a tiny portion of the locals were given access to the colonial 
administration through western education and positions in the official 
hierarchy.   
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Chazan argues that the emergence of anticolonial norms stemmed from the 
obvious discrepancy between the democratic norms the colonial powers were 
drafted on and the reality of the colonies were ruled. During the Second World 
War period this became evident to African political and military elites, and this 
contributed to the demands for independence. Freedom was the main political 
value in this period. Freedom from colonial rule and freedom to choose their 
own policies. The most important project was to mobilize as many groups of 
society as possible in this project, but the emphasis was on the collective 
rights as an independent nation, not on individual political rights.  
The first attempts of liberal government in the post-independence African 
states failed and was replaced with authoritarian regimes, with The Gambia 
and Botswana as the only exceptions in this phase. Chazan argues that this 
was mainly due to the alien nature of democracy, coupled with unfavorable 
economical conditions. The effects of the failure of the initial attempts to 
introduce liberal, democratic government were twofold; firstly it greatly reduced 
the opportunities for protest and a healthy civic life, and secondly state 
structures, bureaucracy and the military grew markedly, resulting in a political 
culture of statism.  
Political development in Africa continued to be lead by the western educated 
elites, and the implementation of participatory procedures and popular 
involvement in politics have been slow in most cases. Governance in all 
aspects has been an elite project, even attempts at introducing western style 
democratic institutions have failed to create the type of social trust that 
democracy is build upon.  
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3.4 Militarism in Africa 
 
Amii Omara-Otunnu (1998) is concerned with the question of the widespread 
occurrence of military coups in Africa, which not only hinders and marginalize 
fundamental requirements for democracy, such as free elections and the right 
of association, but also tends to generate considerable changes in the political 
culture. The result is the emergence of militarism in the society as a whole. 
The hegemonic rule by the military, in which the military substitutes its 
preferences for the will of the general population, and the legitimizing of the 
use of political violence creates a situation where the people have no choice 
but to acquiesce in the values and priorities of the military, rather than 
subscribe to them voluntarily. This undermines the very basis of the moral 
authority of the state.  
Omara-Otunnu (1998) then further divides the effects of militarism into two 
categories; the formal and informal subordinations of all or most of the civilian 
agendas to the military, and the emergence of militarization of the daily 
interactions of the population, where they result to armed and violent ways to 
interact with both each others and the government and the military forces.  
He also proposes ways to determine the level and extent of militarism by 
analyzing the society on the following dimensions (Omara-Otunnu 1998:404): 
* An unreasonable percentage of the state’s budget devoted to military 
spending 
* Extensive use of military symbols and language by those in power  
* The use of the military more to ensure internal order than to protect the           
country and its interests abroad. 
* The civilian population is passive in their relationship with the military and an 
insistence by the government that the people should be disciplined  
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* Persecution of opposition 
* Presentation of political problems as really being military in nature 
* Military success is presented as the route for political and socio-economic 
mobility in the society. 
* The actual domination of civilian institutions by the military  
3.5 The cultural approach 
 
In their work "Culture Troubles", Chabal and Daloz (2006) propose a cultural 
approach to the comparative study of politics. This approach differs from most 
of the cultural theories per se. It is based on an anthropological view in the 
tradition of Geertz and in the sociological tradition of Weber, attempting to 
discern the meaning behind social structures. They place great importance on 
understanding political practices in the local context, and are highly sceptical 
of attempts to compare different societies using terms that could have very 
different meanings from one society to the other. This approach also calls for 
the need to use an interpretive method of analysis, and questions the validity 
and fruitfulness of reducing political behaviour to universalistic variables that 
can be quantified and studied apart from their local, specific setting. It is highly 
recommended that studies of political phenomenon should be very in-depth 
and sensitive to the local context.    
Chabal and Daloz(2006) are sceptical to the tendency to narrow down the 
concept of culture to a set of strict variables in order to compare them using 
traditional means of analysis. Instead they advocate the need to place more 
emphasis on the interpretation of meanings, of how politics actually plays out 
within the formal procedures and institutions. In their view, "politics" do not 
constitute an independent variable, and "political cultures" should not be 
understood as dependent variables that can be manipulated or that they can 
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effect political evolution in any particular direction or lead to regime change. 
And neither do they believe that there is a neat causal relationship where 
culture determines politics. Instead the cultural approach investigates how 
culture shapes the practice of politics in specific settings.  
Chabal and Daloz states that it is impossible set up and replicate experiments 
about social realities in the strict scientific manner of natural sciences. Instead 
they argue that such analysis must meet the test of plausibility, and be based 
on an inductive, not deductive method. They also advocate the need to ask 
real questions in the real world, and let the analysis be terrain driven. This 
should also include historical and anthropological research.  
3.6 Rationality in different contexts 
 
As part of this endeavor to apply the cultural approach to politics, Chabal and 
Daloz explores how the notion of rationality manifests itself in a variety of ways 
in different societies. They agree with the rational choice tradition that people 
will attempt to maximize the benefits of their actions, but they also stress that 
what is considered rational behavior in one part of the world, may differ 
radically from what is considered rational in another part of the world. 
"Irrational behavior can be culturally logical"(p 76). In "Africa Works" this 
perspective is used to understand how seemingly irrational aspects of African 
politics make perfect sense to the people living in that particular setting. 
Consulting witchdoctors or making references to black magic in the political 
game are rational when this is considered to have a real effect on the 
outcome. Attempting to fight against armed enemies with nothing but prayers 
and sticks are rational when people believe that they are immune to bullets, as 
in the case of the followers of Alice Lukwena in Uganda. A member of a low or 
untouchable caste in India may become utterly fatalistic and make little 
29 
 
attempts to improve his conditions because that is how he perceives his 
rightful station in life.  
Rationality in this sense does not only apply to the personal level, it also 
determines how the individual will interact with the greater society and towards 
the state structures. Where the official economy is not working properly, 
people will engage in black market activities. This will deplete the state of 
necessary revenues, but it is the rational choice for people who simply try to 
make a living for themselves. Where the state is unable to provide basic 
services for it's citizens, they will form small scale organizations to meet those 
needs outside of the state structures. Likewise, the excessive spending of 
money and resources by state leaders and big men in the community, often 
amounting to more than what they can actually afford, is rational in a society 
where the status of the leaders reflects positively on the supporting clients. 
The poor people will not take this display of wealth by their patrons as an 
offence; rather it is expected and welcomed as a way of strengthening the ties 
between them. These examples illustrate how practices that may seem 
irrational from a western point of view are in fact perfectly rational when then 
are understood in their particular cultural context.  
The question of identity and the role of the individual in relation to the 
community are closely connected to this understanding of rationality. Again 
Chabal and Daloz points to important cultural differences that have major 
impact on the workings of politics. The western societies place the individual in 
the centre of attention, even though people are influenced by the different 
cultural, religious, ethnic and so on groups they belong to, the individual is still 
the focal point of any analysis. Other societies have a much more collectivistic 
view of the individual, where membership in the extended family, the clan or 
village will determine how they act under different conditions.  
With identity come the closely related concepts of ethnicity and nationality.   
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Using the comparison of African politics to Western politics as an example of 
this, they show how it becomes meaningless to measure the degree of 
democratic consolidation in Africa simply by constitutional framework or formal 
institutions. In their own words (Chabal and Daloz 2006, p 29):” A cultural 
approach makes it possible to understand the extent to which the exercise of 
power, south of the Sahara, is predicated on a personalised concept of 
politics.” This perspective then makes it possible to understand and explain 
why politics and power continues to be focused on the patron-client 
relationship, despite the introduction of democratic practices such as elections, 
participation and accountability.  The underlying logic of the patrimonial 
practices continues to operate within, and on the side of the official democratic 
institutions. To tap into this underlying logic it is necessary to analyze how 
people themselves make sense of the political power structures they are a part 
of. “Africa Works” (Chabal and Daloz 1999) is a study of how African politics 
can be understood using this perspective. Political actions, structures and 
power relations that may seem irrational from a western, legal rational point of 
view, may in fact make perfect sense for the people they affect. Upholding 
patrimonial practices may be a rational political strategy even when it clearly 
undermines political stability in the long run, socio-economic development or 
even ultimately regime survival. The vertical patron-client network allows for 
the exchange of resources and privileges in return for legitimacy and political 
support. 
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4 Methodology 
4.1 Applying the cultural approach perspective 
 
This analysis is an attempt to answer the research question " How can the  
civil-military relations in Uganda be explained  by using a cultural approach?".  
 
As much as I recognize the importance of threat environment, mission 
assignment, objective vs. subjective control, socioeconomic development and 
external pressure in shaping a state’s civil-military relations, I find it necessary 
to go one step further and explain why the state in question choose to employ 
the specific strategy and not the other. I believe the explanation lies in the 
political culture, as this is the underlying dimension guiding and causing the 
choices of missions, control mechanisms and perceived threat environment. 
For instance it seems common sense that a state with a predominantly 
militaristic political culture will have worse civil-military relations than a state 
with a more liberal or corporatist political culture, simply due to differences in 
the way people interact with each other. 
The other variables will be treated as control variables, but due to the limited 
scope of the master thesis, this will by all means not be a complete analysis of 
all relevant factors and variables 
The first step in conducting this analysis is to create a research strategy that 
secures the highest possible degree of validity on all levels. Yin(2003) offer 
guidelines for how case study research should be carried out, and the 
following design for this analysis is based on these recommendations.  
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4.2 Case selection 
 
As stated in the introduction, democratization is a global trend, and the civil-
military relations in any one of these emerging democracies could be 
interesting objects of analysis. Due to the very limited scope of this paper, this 
analysis will be a single-case study, although there would be great advantages 
to compare different types of political culture and their effects on civil-military 
relations. My interest in political culture in Africa was sparked by the 
perspective introduced by Chabal and Daloz(1999). I chose to focus 
specifically on Uganda for several reasons; first and foremost because of the 
extreme importance the military force have played and continues to play in 
Ugandan politics, but also because of the country's strategic security position 
in the region and the interaction between Uganda and the international 
community at large.  
4.3 Single-case study 
 
The longitudinal case study is one of several single-case study rationales 
Yin(2003) identifies. The object is to demonstrate how changes in a 
phenomenon can be predicted by the selected theory at certain specific times.  
The changes in Ugandan civil-military relations will be linked to the events that 
has had the most profound impacts on the political culture. The balance of 
civil-military relations is subject to much quicker changes than the broader 
category of political culture. The balance can go in favour of either parties 
depending on both internal and external events. As shown in the chapter on 
theory, the military will gain influence in times of foreign threats, or if the 
civilian government's hold on power is so weak as to allow for a successful 
coup to take place. Likewise, the civilian counterpart may gain more power 
over the military in peaceful times, when there is strong international pressures 
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to curtail the military's influence or if the civilian party employs divide and split 
techniques to manage the military forces. The gradual militarization of the 
political culture in Uganda will thus be pointed out to have emerged at the 
following mile stones in the recent history of civil-military relations: 
- the ethnic composition of the army during colonial time, the Obote 1 
administration, the rule of Amin, the second Obote government and the current 
Museveni presidency  
- the near total collapse of state and society under the military dictatorship of 
Idi Amin  
- the increasing tendency towards presidentialism during the recent years of 
Museveni's government. 
 
 Yin further differentiates between embedded and holistic case studies. This 
case study is clearly of the embedded type, many different sub-units are 
identified and the analysis is conducted accordingly to each sub-unit. The 
relationship between the civilian government and the military leaders is one of 
these sub-units, others include; the relationship between the military and the 
local population, the ethnic composition of the military in relation to ethnic 
tensions in the country as a whole and the impact of foreign political and 
military pressure. To avoid the pitfall of failing to relate the findings of each 
sub-unit to the larger unit of analysis, the conclusion will focus on bringing all 
the different findings together to show their effects on the actual situation of 
the Ugandan politics.  
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4.4 Establishing validity in the case study 
 
The topic of this  case study is of a  quite theoretical nature, and in order to 
gather data on the empirical level, it is necessary to create operational 
definitions of the theoretical subject. The topic "civil-military relations in 
Uganda" is a vast subject, it covers many aspects, and it is thus necessary to 
break it down into operational definitions that can be analyzed with the data 
available. Drawing on the theories presented earlier, there are two aspects of 
the relationship which must be measured with the empirical data: the level of 
professionalism within the army, and whether the civilian government employs 
the military for their own purposes.  
The first aspect can be further operationalized into the following dimensions: 
 The professional autonomy of the military 
 Military personnel subjected to the rule of law 
 The military's attitudes towards upholding democratic values 
 The military's susceptibility towards manipulation by the civilian government  
In order to assess the civilian government's use of the military's capabilities, 
these dimensions can be singled out: 
 What kind of operations and tasks the military is asked to perform, if they 
are oriented towards external, traditional military tasks or not 
 Use of subjective control mechanisms 
 Whether the government is using the military for legitimizing it's political 
power 
 
 
 
 
35 
 
4.5 Internal validity 
 
Internal validity deals with the establishing of causal effects, whether event x 
led to event y. In qualitative case studies it is not possible to determine  such 
causal links with absolute certainty, and it is therefore important to be sure that 
all possible linkages between events are considered, and that there are not 
other factors causing the apparent relationship between the events. The 
researcher must rely on making correct inferences about the relationship 
between events, and Yin (2003) recommends using multiple strategies. The 
most applicable strategy for this study is explanation building. The separate 
dimensions outlined above will be assessed individually in relation to the 
hypothesis that the civil-military relations in Uganda can only be fully 
understood by using a very broad analytical perspective. 
4.6 External validity 
 
External validity is the question of whether the findings of a particular study 
can be generalized. Case study research rely on analytical generalization. The 
results of the case study should illustrate or criticize the general theory in 
question. These types of case studies are examples of applied science, the 
main objective is explaining or interpreting event or phenomenon using 
existing theory. The main contribution to theory development occurs when 
such a study reveals that the existing theory is inadequate.(Andersen 1997) 
The results of this analysis are based on the specific events that have shaped 
the particular political culture in Uganda, and how the political and military 
actors have shaped their relationship between themselves and society. It is 
thus not directly transferable to other cases. But the process of showing how 
western based theories fail to grasp the informal workings of the civil-military 
36 
 
relations in Uganda, point to the conclusion that these theories might also be 
inadequate to study such relations in other non-western societies.  
4.7 Reliability 
 
Finally, the design should emphasize reliability; all the different steps of the 
analysis must be clearly documented so that another researcher can be able 
to replicate the study.  
The data used in this analysis are collected through secondary sources. 
Reliability must therefore be secured by firstly choosing data sources that are 
in themselves reliable, and secondly the use of these data must duly credited. 
Most of the empirical data in this analysis have been published in international 
journals or been reviewed by other researchers in the field, and their validity is 
thus secured through the peer to peer quality control mechanisms.  
4.8 Strategy for analyzing the data 
 
The overall strategy for analyzing these data is following the theories on civil-
military relations outlined in chapter 2 and 3 to explain how the civil-military 
relations have taken their current form in Uganda, and at the same time 
employ the broader cultural approach to investigate the underlying rationale for 
why they developed this way.  Based on the operationalizations presented 
earlier in this chapter, the analysis will be broken down into three parts, the 
first dealing with the ethnic and regional cleavages, where the historical roots 
of the present situation will be traced from the colonial system through the 
various post-independence regimes, with special emphasis on the importance 
of the manipulation of the ethnic make up of the army. This forms the 
background for an analysis of the internal mission assignment of the UPDF in 
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combating the LRA insurgency, where the ethnicity plays an important role in 
explaining the prolonged conflict. Taken together, these two sub-units of the 
analysis are then related to an explanation of how ethnicity became the 
structure on which the neo-patrimonial logic operates, and how civil-military 
relations are managed in a patron-client relationship. 
 
The second part of the analysis explores the external mission assignment of 
the UPDF in the interventions in the Democratic Republic of Congo, which are 
in part motivated by the government's need to find new resources to feed the 
patron-client relationship with the military in order to maintain the military as a 
source of political power. 
Extensive corruption within the military organization is also analysed as 
another important way for the government to ensure military loyalty. 
The third part of the analysis deals with the ideology and electoral fraud of 
Museveni's National Resistance Movement, which allows for the extra-judicial 
use of military means to ensure regime stability. 
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5 The creation of neo-patrimonial 
civil-military relations 
5.1 The background of Ugandan civil-military 
relations 
 
According to the ideal of military professionalism, the military should have it's 
own separate codex based on obedience to the civilian government who 
decides the role and mission assignment. The military should have a loyalty to 
the nation as a whole. Due to the colonial legacy of pitting ethnic groups 
against each other both within the army and between the army and certain 
ethnic groups and regions in the society at large, the Ugandan military  never 
achieved such a loyalty. The Ugandan army was never able to form a separate 
collective  identity strong enough to overcome the ethnic cleavages that it was 
originally created along.  According to Howe(2001 pp27-73) and 
Otunnu(1998)the British colonial power recruited predominantly from the 
northern regions, and made sure to deploy the troops far away from their 
home areas as a safeguard against rebellion. The British favoured the 
Southern kingdom of Buganda politically, and upon independence, the first 
president Milton Obote saw the resourceful Buganda as a political threat. He 
sought to build up a strong support from the military by continuing the pattern 
of recruiting from the north. The Ugandan army continued to view itself as loyal 
to the more peripheral north, and in opposition to the central, politically 
dominant Buganda.  
Another legacy from the colonial era was the lack of promotion based on merit. 
Initially the British preferred illiterate soldiers who would not be so susceptible 
to political independence movements. The Ugandan Army lacked a trained 
African officers corps at the time of independence, and Idi Amin himself was 
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an uneducated man who lacked the political, diplomatic and economical 
understanding necessary to run a country. In Museveni's NRM, combat 
experience from "fighting in the bush" became the most important qualification 
for political office, and likewise, a close relationship or family ties with 
Museveni could lead to a high rank military position.  
It is clear that the legacy from the colonial army continues to influence the civil-
military relations in Uganda when it comes to ethnic cleavages and the lack of 
military professionalism Huntington deems necessary for maintaining objective 
civilian control. 
At the start of Museveni's military campaign to overthrow the second Obote 
administration in 1981, the country was sharply divided along the north/south 
axis, culturally, ethnically and religiously. It was clear from the onset that the 
NRM had to create peace and order in the whole country in order to legitimize 
it's new regime. Right from the beginning of it's official rule in 1986, the NRM 
was faced with armed opposition from rebel groups, predominantly in the 
north, but later also in the east and west of the country. Rubongoya(2007 
pp81-84) states that some of the rebel forces were incorporated into the NRA, 
but that due to failure to address the underlying structural problems of 
underdevelopment and representation in the north, the insurgencies 
continued. As will be more fully explored below, the Lord's Resistance Army 
enjoyed popular support by the local population in in the beginning, due to the 
deep ethnic and regional distrust at the time of the NRM victory.  
The NRM's failure to settle the severe security problems for the local 
population in the north, was evident in the strong support of political opposition 
in these areas. In the first presidential elections in 1996, the opposition 
candidate Paul Ssemwogere won up to 90% of the votes in the northern 
districts, as compared to Museveni's74.2% of the national vote. Little had 
changed by the 2001 elections, where opposition candidate Besigye got the 
majority vote in the north, whilst loosing the national vote.  
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5.2 Civil-military relations under Obote and Amin 
 
Decalo (1990 pp133-198) gives an account of how the already precarious 
state of civil-military relations deteriorated even more during the personal 
dictatorship of Idi Amin from 1971 to 1979. Decalo too traces the root causes 
of military unprofessionalism and undue use of the military to the above 
mentioned ethnic and regional cleavages. In January 1964, the Ugandan army 
rose to a mutiny and demanded pay rise and more rapid africanization of the 
officer corps. These demands were granted, and showed how vulnerable the 
government was to the army's military strength. The previous small and 
underprivileged army expanded vastly, and at the same time gave young 
Ugandan soldiers the opportunity to rise in rank. It was at this time Idi Amin 
started to build up his ethnic support base in the army by recruiting from his 
own ethnic group, in competition with Obote's preference for soldiers from his 
northern districts. As the soldiers now had discovered how easily they could 
coerce the government into giving in for their demands for more specialized 
equipment, better terms of service and faster promotions, the size of the 
Ugandan army expanded vastly, as did it's budget allocations. 
A corresponding increase in military ethics and professionalism did not follow 
accordingly, as Obote chose to pit different fractions of the army against each 
other and establish special military forces for his own protection because he 
feared the general trend on the continent of army coups. Decalo(2000 p 160) 
illustrates this by quoting a sign at the main entrance to Army Headquarters 
that read:" Politicians Not Allowed". 
 His tactics were not successful though, and after a series of allegations of 
coup plotting and assassinations, Amin finally staged a successful take over 
assisted by his loyal support base in the army.  
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Amin's reign of terror did not only wreck complete havoc on the population, the 
economy and the entire Ugandan state and society, it also destroyed any 
professional capability of the Ugandan army. Out of fear of pro-Obote support, 
Acholi and Langi soldiers were systematically killed, and the military was 
issued the right to arrest any one suspected of any crime. Decalo(2000)quotes 
figures from the International Commission of Jurist that estimated that more 
than 250 000 Ugandans had been killed by it's own government by 1974. 
With large numbers of the officer corps eliminated, promotions were given out 
without any regards to merit or experience. The fate of Charles Arube 
illustrates very well that these arbitrary promotions could have disastrous 
endings; he was promoted to colonel in 1972, reaching the position of chief of 
staff in 1973, and then assassinated by Amin  the following year. (Decalo  
2000 p 167).  
Towards the end of his reign, Amin resorted to creating an image of an 
external threat to the nation. The rationale behind this desperate move was to 
secure his failing control over the army. In October 1978 he launched an 
attack on Tanzania, claiming that Tanzania had attacked first.  Amin had 
grossly underestimated both his own army's capabilities and the strength of 
the Tanzanian army. By April 1979, Kampala had fallen and Amin fled into 
exile.  
By 1979 Uganda was in every respect a destroyed country. The economy was 
in ruins due to failed privatization schemes, the expulsion of the important 
Asian trading community and the almost exclusive reliance on an informal 
market. A series of short lived interim coalitions was replaced in 1980 by the 
second Obote administration. Decalo(2000 p 189) blames the failure of 
Obote's attempts to build political legitimacy on the political culture of violence 
and coercion that now dominated the Ugandan society.  
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The new Ugandan army, Uganda National Liberation Army, became locked in  
dirty war against the National Resistance Army led by Museveni. The fighting 
was concentrated in the southern area know as the Luwero triangel, and the 
civilian population suffered from attacks from both sides, the number of civilian 
casualties reaching as high as 300000. Eventually it was the accidental death 
of army chief of staff Oyite-Ojok that lead to the NRA victory in March  1986.  
5.3 The impact of Obote’s and Amin’s regimes 
 
As theories regarding civil-military relations presuppose that there is at least 
some separation between the civilian leaders and the military establishment, it 
is not possible to apply such theories directly to the kind of military tyranny 
Uganda experienced under the reign of Idi Amin. The impact of this period is 
however of great importance for the kind of civil-military relations that evolved 
later on after some degree of civilian government was reintroduced.  
Heavy reliance on military power had become the most important source of 
political legitimacy. The country was deeply divided along ethnic and regional 
lines, and the subsequent government of the NRM has continued to rely on the 
military to secure political power and quell political opposition. This will be 
explored later on in this analysis, in relation with the elections of 1996 and 
2001.  
The effect of the ethnic and regional cleavages are also very important to take 
into consideration when analyzing the conflict between the NRM and the LRA. 
The previous ethnic manipulation of the army and the deep and mutual distrust 
between different groups of people and between the regions are important to 
consider in order to understand the root causes and the prolonged status of 
the conflict.  
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The military was denied an autonomous role as a separate state institution, 
and although large portions of the national budget were allocated to the 
defence sector, the funds disappeared into corruption, and did not go towards 
building up the professional capacity of the military. This trend of military 
corruption will be explored more fully later on in the analysis, as it is a 
prominent feature of the current civil-military relations under Museveni’s 
government.  
Although analysis of the Ugandan political culture has shown that the 
population is supportive of democratic rule, and mostly reject military and 
authoritarian regimes, it is doubtful if the necessary democratic political values 
have been sufficiently internalized. Without widespread societal values such 
as tolerance, moderation and cooperation, it is difficult to imagine how the 
overall political culture can shift from a militarised nature towards a more 
democratic one.  
5.4 Internal mission assignment 
 
Following Desch‘s(1999) typology of threat environments, the occurrence of 
high levels of internal threats coupled with low external threats would typically 
produce the worst types of civil-military relations. Uganda do not face any 
immediate external threat. The conflicts with the neighboring country of the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) were initiated by Uganda, and the 
conflict with the other neighboring state of Sudan is mostly over internal 
insurgencies spilling over the borders, as the Sudanese government was 
accused of supporting the Lord's Resistance Army, and likewise the Ugandan 
government was suspected of backing the Sudan People's Liberation 
Movement/Army  SPLM/A. The Sudanese support gradually diminished after a 
1999 agreement between Uganda and Sudan, coming to an end in 2005 when 
SPLA came to Power. In later years Sudan has joined forces with Uganda in 
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cracking down on LRA activities in the DRC.  The whole Great Lake region 
has been and continues to be plagued by violent internal conflicts that at times 
explodes and cause considerable instability, but still Uganda lacks any kind of 
external threat that could possibly have unified both civilian and military 
leaders in the common cause of defense.  
 
The long lasting and extremely violent conflict between the LRA and the 
Ugandan government have had severe impacts on the civil-military relations, 
as well as on the Ugandan society as a whole.  
Following Desch’s theories we should therefore expect to find a tendency for 
the civilian government to use subjective control mechanisms, divided 
attitudes among the civilians, but a more unified military.  
The North/South divide has been further deepened in terms of the regional  
divide between the “northerners” and “southerners”, which has left the northern 
part of the country severely underdeveloped. 
The ethnic divide within the military  has likewise become more prominent, 
with mostly Acholi LRA rebels pitted against the UPDF that was created from 
the NRA veterans that “fought in the bush” with Museveni.  
The conflict has drained and limited the amount of resources available to the 
NRM regime for sustaining patron-client relations, and is therefore creating 
more need for the government to rely on military and not democratic means to 
legitimate their regime and stay in power. 
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5.5 The Lord’s Resistance Army 
 
As stated, Uganda does face a high level of internal threats. The biggest threat 
is undoubtedly the LRA, which according to Human Right’s Watch(HRW 2005) 
had caused 1.6 million people to flee their homes in northern Uganda by 1995. 
The origins of the LRA can be traced to the return of soldiers from the 
defeated Uganda National Liberation Army/Front (UNLA) to their home 
districts in the north after the NRA victory. Initially the LRA received some 
support from the local population, but this support diminished quickly as the 
rebels retaliated against the local people suspected of helping the NRM. 
Eventually everybody who sought refuge in the refugee camps set up by the 
government was suspected of being an ally of the NRM. In addition to killing 
and looting the local population, the  LRA also abducted children on a large 
scale, both for recruiting them into their forces and for exploiting them for 
labour and sex. By 1995 UNICEF estimated that at least 20000 children had 
been abducted.  In March 2002, the government launched Operation Iron Fist, 
aimed at rooting out the LRA rebels operating form behind the Sudanese 
border. The result was that the LRA moved their bases back into northern 
Uganda, and expanded these to include western and east western areas as 
well. The atrocities against the local population escalated, with the number of 
IDP's doubling in less than a year, according to HRW(2005). Part of the NRM’s 
strategy was to concentrate even more of the local population in camps. These 
camps were not secure from the rebel’s attacks, HRW reports that more than 
300 refugees were killed in an attack in 2004. Following this attack, the 
government tried to initiate peace talks, but they were unsuccessful. In the 
period between September 2005 and January 2007, the LRA moved their 
bases into the Garamba National Park in the DRC.  
Joseph Kony and four of his commanders have been wanted for war crimes by 
the International Criminal Court since 1995. The LRA claims that these 
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warrants are hindering them in engaging in peace talks, and have successfully 
demanded that any such criminal investigation must take place in Uganda 
instead. In August 2006 the LRA and the Ugandan government signed a 
ceasefire agreement in Juba in Sudan. The agreement called for the LRA 
troops to gather in Sudan, but instead they stepped up their activities in the 
DRC. During 2007 and 2008 LRA fighters abducted civilians from Sudan and 
the Central African Republic, and gathered provisions in preparation for new 
attacks on the Ugandan government. The local Congolese were left mostly 
undisturbed and unharmed until September 2008, when Congolese army 
forces and MONUC launched Operation Rudia in order to cut of LRA supply 
lines and curb their fighting abilities. Only days later the LRA retaliated against 
the local population, killing, raping and abducting children. Ever since Kony 
failed to fulfil the conditions set by the last peace talks, The Ugandan 
government has sought support from Kabila in order to launch a new military 
operation against the LRA forces in Congo. After the September killings, 
Kabila agreed to support “Operation Lightning Thunder”, which was to start on 
December 14.th 2008. The LRA retaliated with  “the Christmas massacre” 
which was carried out on the local population during the Christmas 
celebrations, leaving close to a 1000 civilians dead.(HRW 2010). Although the 
Ugandan led operation officially ended in March 2009, there still remains 2000 
Ugandan soldiers in the area for intelligence purposes, and Congolese and 
Ugandan military chiefs meet regularly to assess the situation.  
5.6 The significance of ethnicity in the LRA conflict 
 
The former UN under secretary-general Olara A. Otunnu (2006) stresses the 
underlying ethnic dimension of the conflict between the LRA and the Ugandan 
military. He claims the government is in fact allowing and participating in an 
outright genocide of the Acholi people of the three northern districts of Acholi, 
Lango and Teso, where 90% of the local population are forced to live in 
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detention camps. Although  these camps are ostensibly created by the 
government in order to protect the population from LRA attacks, he claims that 
the IDP's are in fact subject to rape, killings and other human rights abuses by 
the soldiers stationed there. The entire Acholi people are "being systematically 
destroyed -- physically, culturally, and economically." These statements must 
be seen in light of Otunnu's Acholi heritage, recent election as President of the 
Uganda People's Congress, and his probable candidature in the February 
2011 national elections, but they are illustrative of how deep the mistrust and 
resentment runs between the northerners  and southerners. 
There is however little doubt that ethnicity does matter in the LRA conflict, and 
the way it is handled by the NRM. Museveni started out with a very narrow 
base of support mainly from the Bantu tribes of southern and central Uganda. 
When the NRA defeated the Uganda National Liberation Army(UNLA),which 
was made up mostly Acholi and Langi soldiers, many of these fled to the 
countryside in fear of retaliation from the victors. Uganda People's Democratic 
Army was formed from these soldiers fleeing the NRA, and became the first 
armed opposition army to fight the NRA. It soon disintegrated, with some 
soldiers joining the NRA, and other forming the Holy Spirit Movement. 
 
The Ugandan military has since it's creation been systematically manipulated 
according to ethnic diving lines in order to provide the leader of the regime with 
much needed legitimacy and as a crude source of power. As a result, the 
armed forces have not developed as a distinct entity separate from the 
executive branches of the government. The civil-military relations reflect the 
situation in other areas of the state, with little or no actual separation between 
the institutions, or between the personal goals and power of the ruler and the 
state organization. As each authoritarian ruler has pitted different ethnic 
groups against each other, both within the military ranks, and between the 
military and the civilian population, ethnicity has emerged as both a threat and 
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guarantee for the population's security. Generation after generation have been 
scarred by this very unhealthy civil-military relationship, and the connection 
between ethnicity and personal safety has greatly contributed to the overall 
militarization of the political culture in Uganda. Even with the introduction of 
formal procedures for regulating civil-military relations in a democratic style, 
the political culture will still be dominated by the lessons learned from the past 
experiences.  
5.7 The significance of the irrational in the LRA 
conflict 
 
The UNLA soldiers who returned to their civilian life after the NRM victory 
found it difficult to be reintegrated into the society. Acker(2004) mentions how 
this in part was due to their reluctance to undergo cleansing rituals, that was 
necessary to allow them back into the community. Human Right's Watch has 
investigated the common perception among the affected Acholi, and found that 
although people want justice and punishment for those LRA soldiers that have 
plagued them for so many years, it is also a widespread sentiment that there 
should be forgiveness. Acholi culture places a great stress on a ceremony 
called mato oput, in which the wrong doers must confess their crimes and pay 
retribution. The Ugandan government and the International Criminal Court( 
ICC) do however wish to prosecute Kony and other LRA leaders in the 
International Criminal Court in Haag. This has complicated the peace 
negotiations between the two parties, and is part of the reason why Kony 
refuses to fulfil all the terms of the agreement until he gets a blanket amnesty.  
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6 Maintaining neo-patrimonial civil-
military relations 
6.1 Involvement in external warfare 
 
Assigning the military missions that are directed externally and that are of a 
traditional war fighting or defending  nature, is supposedly conducive towards 
building a stronger sense of military professionalism, as well as keeping the 
military from meddling in domestic politics. William Reno (2002) argues that 
the opposite development has taken place within the UPDF in Uganda, 
especially since the 1996 invasion by Ugandan military forces into the DRC. 
The official reason for the invasion was the apparent failure by the Congolese 
government to control territory bordering with Uganda, thus providing Ugandan 
rebels with a platform for attacking Ugandan sovereignty. 
 Reno(2002) points out how the invasion was also motivated by the vast 
possibilities of  economic exploitation of Congolese natural resources. He 
gives examples of how the official gold exports rose from $12,4 million in 
1994-5, to a staggering $112 million two years later. High-ranking officers, as 
well as close relatives to the President were involved in the illicit business 
activities, and this situations created further disturbances in the civil-military 
relationship in Uganda. Reno(2002) states that although the increased state 
revenues helped finance public sector spending, and gave Museveni 
increased leverage towards the international donor community; the invasion 
severely shifted the power balance in favour of the military. 
This was seen in the strong support of Besigye by many UPDF officials in the 
2001 elections, and in complaints about how Museveni’s relatives took 
advantage of  military equipment and infrastructure in their business activities 
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in Congo, while many soldiers suffered loss of salary and commodities due to 
corruption like this.  
The enrichment of military personnel also rose concerns about what would 
happen when the forces eventually were to return to Uganda and be 
reintegrated in their local communities. They would be hard to control for the 
government, building their own networks of clients and opposing the 
government’s leadership and discipline.  
 
Huntington’s distinction between objective and subjective control mechanisms 
does not explain a great deal of  why Museveni chose to adopt this strategy 
and allow the military to become involved in business activities in the DRC, it 
merely predicts the outcome, such as a weakening of professional values and 
ethics among the military. A more detailed, and context specific analysis will 
instead reveal that Museveni was facing at once both opportunities and 
constraints laid out by the international donor community. As both Chabal and 
Daloz(1999) and Reno(2002) argues, apparently weak states in the periphery 
of both political, economical and geographical strategic arena still have a 
measure of leverage and opportunities for manipulating the more powerful 
states in the international community. Uganda has been hailed by the 
international community as a successful example of structural adjustment 
programs, and this is part of the reason why the obvious practices of 
corruption, unconstitutional presidential decrees such as extending the terms 
of presidential terms and even military interventions have received less 
criticism and had fewer consequences than one would expect. 
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6.2 Military corruption 
 
A vital part of healthy civil-military relations in any democracy is that the 
military are given the necessary funds to achieve their military objectives, that 
the technology is up to date, and that military personnel of all classes are 
receiving their pay and benefits. This enhances the military's professionalism, 
in Huntington's terms. Corruption may occur at all levels, both inside the 
military establishment, and by the civilian leaders. As will be demonstrated by 
concrete examples below, extreme cases of corruption has been documented 
in the case of the Ugandan military. This has had a profound impact not only 
on the actual fighting abilities of the UPDF, but on the organization as a whole, 
rendering it demoralized and unprofessional. With Uganda facing real military 
challenges from several opposing fractions, most notably the LRA and other 
rebel groups in the north, as well as a very tense regional security setting, it 
would seem that a strong, professional military would be a priority of the 
government. Instead, the national leader, and head of the defence ministry, 
president Museveni, has chosen to allow this corruption to continue and opted 
for controlling the military through subjective control measures.  
Corruption is widespread in all levels of the military establishment in Uganda, 
from ordinary soldiers looting the population during security operations in the 
north, to large scale corruption involving million of dollars gone missing at the 
top. Tangri and Mwenda (2003) investigated this matter in the last decades, 
and found evidence of massive corruption especially dealing with 
acquiescence of equipment and large arms. 
From 1996 to 1998 the NRM government and senior military officers were 
involved in the process of buying Russian helicopter gunship. In the end, 
Uganda paid $12 million for two outdated pieces of machinery with falsified 
logbooks. Ruyondo, a foster child of Museveni, and Museveni's brother Salim 
Saleh received huge commissions from the deal, and they were found guilty of 
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corruption and bribery by a judicial commission. Saleh confessed to having 
received this commission for the arms deal, but was forgiven by the president, 
and simply urged to use that profit towards fighting the LRA. 
A similar scandal occurred  when it was decided to buy second hand jet 
fighters and anti-aircraft guns through Israeli middlemen, in order to fight the 
Sudanese attacks in the North. The jet fighters had insufficient gas tank 
capability to perform the trip to the fighting areas, and two of them even lacked 
a wing upon arrival. On top of that, this purchase ended up being more costly 
than buying them directly from the manufacturer.  
Saleh, the Major-General, was also at the time acting as the de facto overseer 
of the Ministry of Defence. He was also operating as a businessman, providing 
services to the military, and made a huge profit transporting soldiers and 
materials to the Ugandan bases in the DRC. 
Corruption and mismanagement of funds were also evident in the almost 
absurd case of food provisions that were claimed to be expired upon delivery. 
After serious disagreement within in the military, it was decided in 1999 to 
enter into a million dollar contract with a South African company, who was 
going to supply food rations. When the food arrived, UPDF officials claimed 
the food had expired. This claim was disputed by the South African company, 
and through international arbitration, the Ugandan government had to pay 
more than $2 millions for breach of contract. In addition to a complete waste of 
money, the result was that thousands of UPDF soldiers stationed in the DRC 
went hungry during 1999 and 2000. The results of further mismanagement and 
corruption at the upper levels of the military administrations was also literally 
felt on the soldiers backs when 60000 pairs of uniforms supplied by a South 
Korean company turned out to be way too small in size to fit the Ugandan 
soldiers.  
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6.3 Corruption in the conflict in the DRC 
 
The 1998 intervention in the northern parts of the DRC offered great 
opportunities for military officers to engage in illicit business activities under 
the guise of the military operation.  
Saleh was among those exploiting this situation. A UN investigation in 2001 
and 2002 found him, and the head of the UPDF operation, Kazini guilty of 
looting minerals and timber. A million dollars in cash was found in the remains 
of a plane crash along the border with the DRC in 1998, and it was revealed 
that it was meant for buying gold by a company Saleh was involved in. 
Kazini was accused of spending funds allocated for the soldiers' pay on his 
own business activities. When the scandal surfaced, the officer responsible for 
paying the salaries  was found dead, seemingly from committing suicide, but 
the opposition and his family claimed it was a military cover up. Another 
paymaster allegedly disappeared to Dubai with about a million dollars of the 
soldiers' pay three years later. According to the sources of  Tangri and 
Mwenda(2003), this was another cover up by high ranking military officers.  
Reno(2002) quotes figures on the export of natural resources from the DRC: 
Gold exports rose from $12 million dollars in 1994-5, to $112 million two years 
later. At the same time, gold production in Uganda barely rose at all in the 
same period. Clearly the gold exported from Uganda came from Congolese 
territory. By 1999, gold had become the second largest export article in 
Uganda. UPDF officers also engaged in other forms of business activities, 
such as operating cell phone networks, and using military owned means of 
transportation for private profit. 
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6.4 Explaining military corruption in Uganda 
 
Organized, large scale military corruption has become an important instrument 
for Museveni to control the military. This can be understood as a rational 
choice when considering the state of the civil-military relations in Uganda as a 
whole. First of all, Museveni came to power through a military campaign 
himself, and has never attempted to keep military and politics separate. His 
political power is based on his near total control of the military. His claim for 
political legitimacy is narrow, and without the military to back him up, he would 
risk being ousted in elections.  
Considering the dominant political culture in Uganda, where military coups 
have been a legitimate way of getting political power, he has good reasons for 
fearing a strong, professional army. If the army developed a value orientation 
towards democratic ideals, it would become less susceptive to his subjective 
control. Securing the continued support from the military is thus a major 
concern for the NRA government. The divide and conquer method, ethnic 
dividing and sheer terror employed by former rulers like Amin and Obote are 
not a viable strategy for Museveni. The main reason for this is the changing 
international climate, where donor countries pose much stricter conditions for 
aid. As Reno(2002) investigates, Museveni is still able to manipulate the 
international community and the IMF's, but he has find other strategies.  
Allowing the military to engage in revenue seeking activities in the DRC has 
the most welcome side effect of boosting the overall economic performance of 
the country. Although no tax is extracted when these goods are brought into 
the country, Uganda still gains economically. The companies that are involved, 
find it more convenient to operate the export side of their business from 
Ugandan territory, because here they have access to insurance and safe 
export to third countries. This in turn inflates Ugandan official export statistics.  
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Uganda is a client of the Heavily Indebted Poor Country Initiative (HIPC), a 
program to reduce the burdens of repaying debts for some of the worst 
affected countries. The international donors have vested interests in seeing 
their participants succeed according to the structural adjustment programs 
they advocate. Reno(2002) argues that this is one of  the reasons the donor 
countries tend to be more lenient with countries that seem to have strong 
economic growth. Uganda's official spending on military and defence should 
according to these agreements not supersede 1.9 % of the GPD . The official 
government statistics alone show that Uganda exceeds this limit, and 
independent international institutions estimate that the figures rise as high as 
3%. 
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7 Use of neo-patrimonial civil-military 
relations to secure regime survival 
7.1 The ideology of the Ugandan government 
 
The Museveni government, although somewhat of a show case for the 
international community when it comes to economic stability and development, 
is not widely renowned for its democratic qualities. There are severe 
democratic shortages when it comes to representation and political rights, but 
the interesting point in this respect is that the president does not pretend to be 
a great believer in democracy for the African states either. Despite a great 
need for international support and aid, Museveni has made it clear on many 
public occasions that multiparty politics in Uganda would fail to consolidate 
cross cutting class interests, and instead follow ethnic and social cleavages in 
the society. There is no doubt that the current move towards multipartyism is 
forced from the outside, and that Museveni and the NRM movement are 
playing all their cards to stay in power, which includes the advantage of sole 
access to state resources as political parties are still not legal, extra judiciary 
control over press and the electoral process itself.  
The most important point for this discussion is however the unhealthy 
influence the incumbent government has over the military. According to the 
HRW(2006) Museveni reportedly appeared to suggest, at a rally in Entebbe on 
January 14, that only the NRM-O government could control the army: “All the 
past governments collapsed because they failed to control the army. . .   [We 
have managed to tame it.” 
Edward Kannyo (2004) concludes an article on the ongoing constitutional 
reforms in Uganda with a warning note on what could happen with the civil-
military relations when Museveni finally has to step down (at least if he is 
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forced to leave his office after his current term); He regards an intervention by 
the army as a possibility in the worst case scenario, as he finds the civil-
military relations to be the least institutionalized part of the governmental 
system in Uganda. This is partly due to the strong personal ties between 
Museveni and his officers who to a large degree share common ethnic ties as 
well as shared history and camaraderie. It is also likely that the military as a 
whole is fearful of a new ideology of transparency and openness that could 
come with a new, more democratic government.  
There is no doubt that the military in Uganda has been and continues to be 
controlled by the government through subjective control. Propaganda, neo-
patrimonial practices and ethnicity are the dominant traits of the civil-military 
relationship. 
7.2 Electoral fraud 
 
Human Rights Watch (2006) reports concern with the state of the civil-military 
relations in Uganda in the period leading up to the February 23. presidential 
and parliamentary elections of 2006 as well as the following local council 
elections. Their concern is mainly with an increasing militarization of the 
society, as the NRM government is fighting to improve its odds.  
According to the HRW(2006),  the NRM government had appointed several 
former and current high ranking military officers to important political position in 
the last months. There had also been many reports of police and military 
personnel intimidating and using violence against members of the opposition, 
as well as trying to influence the public opinion. This is clearly contributing to 
the sort of civil-military relations that Desch(1998) finds most destructive, 
namely a situation where the military’s mission is both oriented internally and 
non-military in nature.  
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In preparation of the elections, the military and police forces issued a special 
Code of Conduct for Security Personnel during an electoral Process. In short 
this is instructions for military and security personnel to abstain from direct 
involvement in political party work or officially support political candidates. It is 
however doubtful how much effect this code of conduct will have as it has 
already been violated in practice, especially as the president himself reputedly 
have made contradictory statements and threats. 
7.3 Silencing the political opposition   
 
The Ugandan newspaper The Monitor(2008) published an article on how the 
UPDF are not subject to the same laws as the rest of the population. 
A special Local War Crimes Division of the High Court was established as part 
of the Juba Peace Agreement between the government and the leaders of the 
LRA. Despite opposition from both Ugandan MP's and international 
organizations such as UN and HRW, these special courts are not going to try 
UPDF soldiers accused of committing human rights abuse during the 
campaign against the LRA. The government claim that the military court 
tribunals are capable of punishing such crimes, but human rights groups 
question the transparency and openness of these military courts, and are 
concerned for the justice of the victims of the conflict.  
 
In his list of three essential conditions for a democratic civil-military 
relationship, Fitch(1998) states that military personnel must be subject to the 
same law as the civilian population, and not enjoy special privileges or rights. 
This condition would seem to work the other way as well; the Human Rights 
Committee has stated that civilians should only be put on trial before a military 
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court under very special conditions. The leading opposition member, Dr. Kizza 
Besigye and 22 members of the Forum for Democratic Change party, was put 
on trial before a military court in January 2006, although they had been 
released previously by the High Court. The chairman of the General Court 
Martial now states that the military court is independent from the High Court. 
This issue is now under debate in the Constititutional Court. There has 
previously been an uncontested precedence in the Ugandan legal system that 
states that the High Court is supreme. 
7.4 Human rights violations by the UPDF 
 
Much of the literature on civil-military relations warns against the use of official 
military forces in internal security operations. Such activities should instead be 
conducted by non-military security organizations. The military is less 
transparent and subject to less public accountability and scrutiny. It may 
therefore be difficult to hold soldiers who commit human right abuses or 
engage in criminal activity responsible and punish them. Such internal 
missions will also compromise the professionalism of the military, because of 
the confusion of roles.  
In the northern parts of the country, where the conflict between The LRA and 
UPDF has put more than two million people in the dire need of military 
protection, the HRW has received reports that official military personnel have 
threatened to withdraw their protection if the people cast their vote for the 
opposition parties. These threats are not regarded as confirmed by the HRW, 
but it gives an indication of how the people feel treated by the official military 
forces.  
The UPDF has a long history of involvement in internal security operations. 
Human Rights Watch(2007) reports more than fifty eyewitness reports of 
human rights abuse by members of the UPDF in the northern region of 
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Karamoja from September 2006 trough January 2007. The UPDF was 
assigned to disarm bandits operating in the area, but the methods they 
employed included beating and torturing civilians, firing at children and burning 
down homesteads. The UPDF officials denied many of these accusations, and 
most of the crimes went unpunished.  
 
During the Ugandan intervention of the DRC, HRW reported many accounts of 
the UPDF attacking civilians, often not making any difference between Mai Mai 
fighters and the civilian population. The Ugandan soldiers also engaged in 
looting, and as a result the civilians feared them equally much as the other 
groups fighting in the areas. 
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8 Conclusion 
8.1 The assessment of traditional theories 
 
Uganda is currently recognized as being on the path towards democratization. 
This means that there exists some formal separation between the state and 
society, and also that the military is constitutionally brought under civilian 
control. Some of the key concepts of traditional theories are useful to the 
extent that they define how civil-military relations should be structured in 
democracies, and under what circumstances they are likely to improve or 
deteriorate.  
Bringing the military firmly under civilian control is an important step towards 
achieving a stable, consolidated democracy. The main features of a 
democratic civil-military relationship are according to Fitch(1998) :1. Civilian 
control over the military, but allowing for some military autonomy according to 
it's professional expertise. 2. Complete civilian control over policy making. 3. 
The military must be subject to the same rule of law as every member of the 
society.  
Huntington (1994) distinguishes between two different strategies the civilian 
government can use in order to ensure civilian control over the military; 
objective and subjective control mechanisms. Desch (1999) brings further 
important theoretical dimensions to the subject of studying civil-military 
relations by investigating the implications of the orientations and missions 
assigned to the military.  
 
Following only these concepts and theories, we do not gain any real insight 
into the rationale behind today's civil-military relations in Uganda. They would 
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seem to be in a disastrous state, with a complete lack of military 
professionalism, lack of sanctions towards soldiers who have committed 
crimes, total reliance on subjective control mechanism and an internal role and 
mission assignment of the military. Why would this situation be allowed to 
continue in a new democratic system? 
 
The main argument of this analysis was that it is possible to study how the 
civil-military relations in today's Uganda are actually rational and logical for the 
actors involved. The neo-patrimonial networks of the leaders granting favours 
and resources in return for political support are still more important than the 
formal state structures.  
8.2 Allowing for context specific analysis 
  
The focus of this paper is the problems that arise when one tries to apply 
these theories to the empirical situation in non-western societies, and 
especially in situations where the formal democratic institutions may hide an all 
together different political reality. To grasp the realities of politics under such 
circumstances, the initial hypothesis of this analysis was that it is necessary to 
find analytical strategies that are able to incorporate a broader spectrum of 
dimensions than the above mentioned theories allows for. Chabal and Daloz 
provide such alternative and more context sensitive analytical strategies in 
their works "Africa Works"(1999) and "Cultural Troubles"(2006). They propose 
the necessity for understanding the rationale behind seemingly irrational 
(political) behaviour. Instead of trying to apply theories constructed on the 
western, legal-rational political system, it is more fruitful to investigate how 
politics are actually played out in societies that have a more collective-oriented 
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perspective, and which operates on different assumptions of what is 
considered legitimate and proper in politics.  
 
This analysis has sought to answer the initial research question of how the 
civil-military relations of Uganda can be explained by using a cultural approach 
such as Chabal and Daloz (1999) apply to their work on understanding the 
realities of Africa politics.  
It has become very clear that this approach is crucially necessary to grasp the 
reasons and rationales behind the strategies the Ugandan leaders have 
chosen to legitimize their governments and ultimately secure the survival of 
their regimes. It is not enough to note that ethnic and regional tensions have 
been manipulated by the leaders, it is also necessary to understand that these 
tensions have their root both in the political culture and in the historical 
experiences of the colonial rule. Western rationality has more or less moved 
away from a collective thinking, the focus point of everything in the society is 
the individual, and the individual in relation to the state which operates almost 
like an impersonal entity of it's own. African politics must be understood on 
different premises, as the orientation is much more about the collective fate 
and good of the clan, the tribe and the ethnic group. National leaders are not 
national leaders in the sense that they represent the country as a whole, rather 
the perception is that they will favour their own ethic support base. This is why 
ethnicity continues to play an important role in the political culture of Uganda, 
and also specifically in the civil-military relations. The impact of ethic tension 
also reflects the two sides of the civil-military relationship; in the role and 
mission assignment the civilian-government accords the military, and in the 
problems with unprofessionalism within the army. 
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8.3 Main results 
 
The first parts of the analysis focused on the importance of the tensions 
between the Bantu south and the Nilotic north. To put it very simply, Ugandan 
politics can be seen almost like a thug of war between these two, where 
political supremacy and military power have been replaced with political 
inferiority and violent repercussions.  
The Southern kingdom of Buganda was historically more developed in terms 
of political and social institutions. That was partly the reason why the British 
colonial powers chose to recruit soldiers to the colonial army form the northern 
tribes. These tribes also had a reputation of being of a more “martial” nature, 
and thus more fitted to be the loyal and unquestioning foot soldiers the British 
desired. The analysis has shown how the ethnic composition of the army 
continued to be manipulated by every government since independence. The 
result is today’s situation where the conflict between Museveni’s NRM and the 
LRA is proving almost impossible to resolve either politically or by military 
means. The deep mistrust the northern population holds against the 
government is reflected in the strong support of the political opposition, as well 
in the belief that the government is allowing it’s army to commit violence and 
crime against them.  
 
Next the analysis explored the rationale behind the Ugandan intervention in 
the Democratic Republic of Congo. Reno(2002) explains the underlying 
motivation of Museveni’s government, and the most important reasons for this 
intervention seems to be the president’s need to sustain his patron-client 
relations with the military by giving officers access to loot the natural resources 
in the DRC.  
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Due to Museveni’s need to at least nominally comply with the structural 
adjustment programs of the IMF’s, he is forced to reduce public spending on 
the defence sector. Creating an illusion that the whole region’s stability is in 
danger means that the international community and donors will accept larger 
budget allocations to the military, as well as be more lenient towards accepting 
other undemocratic practices to continue in other areas of the administration.  
 
In order to maintain his personal control over the military forces to secure his 
own regime and to be able to deter the opposition, Museveni has also allowed 
for extensive corruption to take place when it comes to procurement of military 
materiel. Tangri and Mwenda (2003) show the enormous scale of this kind of 
corruption, and that the main benefactorers are the president’s own family and 
those in his closes circle. The move is quite dramatic from the initial stress on 
the NRM as being a movement that was supposed to be a broad based 
organization towards a more personalistic rule.  
 
This trend of collecting political and military power into the hands of the 
president is also evident in the increasing exclusion of opposition voices, even 
as the country is formally moving towards allowing multi-party elections. Again 
the international community is being appeased by the formal move towards 
allowing political parties to form and compete in elections. But as Human 
Rights Watch(2006) reported of clear cases of the military being used to 
manipulate the 2006 elections in Museveni’s favour, it seems that the military 
will continue to be used in unconstitutional ways which will further compromise 
it’s professionalism.  
 
66 
 
8.4 The civil-military relations as part of the wider 
political culture 
 
A regime that bases it’s political legitimacy on neo-patrimonialism is not likely 
to produce democratic civil-military relations. The introduction of formal state 
institutions does not automatically mean that the underlying rationale of client 
support in exchange for resource distribution will change. Corruption, 
appointments to government positions based on ethnic ties or personal 
relations, and use of force and coercion will take place within the new state 
structures, and they may not be easily detected if only the official picture of the 
government and state is analyzed by outsiders. Substantial change in civil-
military relations seems only possible if democratic values are sufficiently 
internalized to allow for political legitimacy based on representation instead of 
crude military power.  
Museveni’s personal hold over the UPDF and the ways he chooses to employ 
it’s military capabilities can only be fully understood by taking into 
consideration how militarization of the entire society and the logic of neo-
patrimonialism have shaped the political culture in Uganda.  
Uganda scores high on all the characteristics of a militarised society listed by  
Otunnu(1998), and the government of Museveni is not showing signs of 
moving away from it’s dependency on military power in order to secure it’s 
survival. Rubongoya(2007p 147) finds promising signs of democratic values 
taking root in the civic society, especially during the first term of Museveni’s 
presidency. Political opposition parties and various interest groups trained 
people in democratic values and practices. But Rubongoya(2007 p 195) 
questions if this is enough to cause a change in the political culture, as the 
majority of the Ugandan people are simply to poor to afford to severe the neo-
patrimonial ties that ensures distribution of goods from the government to it’s 
clients. This was evident from the results of the 2005 Afrobarometer survey, 
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where a majority of the rural population was in favour of lifting the limits on 
presidential terms to allow Museveni to run for office again, whereas the urban 
population voted against it.  
 
As the true nature of the civil-military relations often reveals itself during times 
of great change, the scheduled elections of 2011 will prove if Museveni will 
allow for the potential peaceful turn over of office, or if he will again use his 
strong personal grip of the military forces to manipulate the electoral process. 
Rubongoya(2007 pp195) is sceptical about Uganda's chances to evolve into a 
stable democracy where free and fair elections can take place. He is mostly 
concerned with the curtailment of constitutionalism, as Museveni has removed 
the limits on presidential terms, and the move towards presidentialism, where 
more and more power is being concentrated in the executive office of the 
president, at the expense of the other institutions of the democratic system. 
Museveni has relied heavily on the military forces at his disposal to make this 
happen, and at the same time caused even greater damage to the 
professionalism of the Ugandan army.  
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